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The Fate of Firms: Explaining
Mergers and Bankruptcies
Clas Bergström, Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren, and 
Martin T. Wells*
Using a uniquely complete data set of more than 50,000 observations of
approximately 16,000 corporations, we test theories that seek to explain
which firms become merger targets and which firms go bankrupt. We find
that merger activity is much greater during prosperous periods than during
recessions. In bad economic times, firms in industries with high bankruptcy
rates are less likely to file for bankruptcy than they are in better years, sup-
porting the market illiquidity arguments made by Shleifer and Vishny
(1992). At the firm level, we find that, among poorly performing firms, the
likelihood of merger increases with poorer performance, but among better
performing firms, the relation is reversed and chances of merger increase
with better performance. Such a changing relation has not been detected
in prior merger studies. We also find that low-growth, resource-rich firms
are prime acquisition targets and that firms’ debt capacity relates negatively
to the likelihood of a merger. Debt-related variables, leverage and secured
debt, play an especially prominent role in distinguishing between which
firms merge and which firms go bankrupt.
I. Introduction
All firms will cease to exist. Bankruptcies and mergers, two ways in which
firms terminate, have several similarities. Both transfer control of corporate
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resources to new owners. Both can enhance value in the face of inefficient
performance. Mergers may increase the combined value of the target and
acquiring firms because the combined firm exploits operating and financial
synergies, or corrects managerial failures (see Jarrell et al. 1988; Jensen &
Ruback 1983 for reviews of the merger literature). A bankrupt firm’s assets
can be transferred to more productive uses or the firm’s organizational struc-
ture can be changed so that the firm can continue to operate (see John 1993;
Jones 1987; Wruck 1990 for reviews of the bankruptcy literature).
Industrywide and economywide conditions can affect the rates of 
both forms of restructuring. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) point out that in
recessions many asset buyers are credit constrained and cannot pay the 
full value of assets. Sellers may try to postpone transfer of the firm until
markets become more liquid, thereby reducing merger activity. During
recessions, firms may resist liquidating bankruptcy while creditors may be
more prone to restructure debts, or to reorganize firms to avoid selling in
thin markets.
This article investigates the determinants of merger and bankruptcy
for the mass of Swedish firms. The main enhancement of prior studies stems
from this study’s comprehensive sample and simultaneous study of both tran-
sitions. The data used are a nearly complete sample of all Swedish firms with
20 or more employees. The sample consists of approximately 16,000 firms,
including 1,800 bankruptcies and 1,100 mergers, and covers the years 1990
to 1994.
Four advantages of the sample are worth noting. First, the sample
avoids the sample size and sample bias issues that attend most studies of firms
in transition. Traditional bankruptcy and merger studies must scavenge for
firms in transition across many years because, for the large, public firms for
which data are readily available, bankruptcy and merger are rare events.
Ambrose and Megginson’s (1992) study of mergers, for example, used a
sample of 169 firms that achieved target status over a six-year period together
with 267 nontarget firms. Bankruptcy studies commonly rely on smaller
samples gathered over several years: Jones’s (1987) literature review notes
leading studies that include fewer than 50 bankrupt firms and similar
numbers of nonbankrupt controls.
Because bankruptcy and merger are relatively rare events for public
firms, gathering a reasonable number of bankrupt or merged firms is diffi-
cult. The tendency is to oversample transitional firms and to undersample
active, healthy firms. But even large, random subsamples of active firms, 
analyzed using methodology that accounts for sample size (Palepu 1986),
can generate misleading parameter estimates (Bergström et al. 1999). Some
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studies reduce sample bias effects by case-control methodology using
matched samples. But matched sample results are of questionable validity in
uncontrolled, nonexperimental settings (Bergström et al. 1999; Breslow &
Day 1980).
Possibly because of the small, biased samples used, results of merger
studies vary considerably: Ambrose and Megginson’s replication of an earlier
study found none of the variables to be significant and that the model had
negligible explanatory power (Ambrose & Megginson 1992:584). Shumway
(2001) found that accounting variables used in important bankruptcy
studies are not statistically significant. Moyer (1977) shows that the predic-
tive ability of bankruptcy models differs greatly between studies.
The second advantage of our sample is that it allows simultaneous study
of both bankruptcies and mergers. It thus permits studying, in a common sample,
factors that affect the likelihood of both transitions. Studying the two tran-
sitions in isolation from one another is questionable (Ohlson 1980:111).
Both bankruptcy and merger are plausible exit paths for inefficient firms (as
are other outcomes not studied here).
Third, this study’s near-complete sample of Swedish firms includes the
mass of small and mid-sized firms. Prior studies focus on public firms. The forces
shaping transitions likely differ between large, public and small, private
firms. Evidence suggests differences in market reactions to takeovers of
public firms and takeovers of private firms (Chang 1998). In addition, public
firms may become hostile takeover targets but closely held private firms
cannot become such targets. Evidence suggests that different factors drive
hostile takeovers and friendly takeovers (Powell 1997). Furthermore, owners
are more likely to manage nonpublic firms, implying that agency problems
stemming from the separation of ownership and control are less severe.
Thus, takeovers intended to replace inefficient management should be less
common in small and mid-sized firms. However, agency problems between
firms and creditors might be more severe in nonpublic firms, since small
and mid-sized firms may be more flexible and thus better able to increase
the risk of their investment projects (Grinblat & Titman 1997). As a conse-
quence, access to external capital is probably more constrained for small and
mid-sized firms, and thus, financial synergy-based mergers might be more
common.1
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1Nonpublic firms are of importance aside from their difference from public firms. They 
comprise a substantial part of the economy. For example, in Sweden, the sum of all sales 
for publicly held firms in 1994 was approximately 986 billion kronor. The sum of sales for
Fourth, the sample’s mass of healthy firms allows inclusion of time-
varying accounting and industry parameters that shape transition choice
through both strong and weak economic conditions. The sample studied
covers years in which the Swedish economy first staggered and then began
to flourish. This enables testing whether industrywide and economywide
financial conditions relate to merger and bankruptcy activity. Small, biased
samples using transitional firms gathered across lengthy time periods 
make it difficult to obtain reliable parameter estimates for compact time
periods.
A. Summary of Principal Results
The data yield insights into bankruptcy and merger at the economywide,
industrywide, and individual-firm levels. Merger activity is much greater in
prosperous periods than during recessions. For example, in the recession
year 1991, only 1.1 percent (119 of 11,578) of the firms in the sample
merged. The corresponding figure for 1994, when the Swedish economy
began to flourish, is 4.7 percent (468 of 9,967). These findings support the
view that market liquidity influences merger activity (Shleifer & Vishny
1992). Bankruptcies are, as one would expect, more common in a recession
year such as 1991 than in a growth year such as 1994. However, we find that
in stressed economic times, firms in industries with high bankruptcy rates
are less likely to file for bankruptcy than they are in better economic cli-
mates. In other words, firms in distressed industries resist liquidating 
bankruptcy in bad times and flock to it in good times. This result is also con-
sistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992), who suggest that asset sales are less
common during recessions, since the prices received for the assets would be
lower.
At the firm level, financial synergy factors help explain mergers. 
First, we explore whether mergers are more likely if there is a mismatch
between the bidder’s and the target’s growth opportunities and available
financial resources. Palepu (1986) suggests that low-growth and cash-rich
firms, as well as high-growth and cash-poor firms, are likely merger targets.
The results partly support the theory: low-growth and cash-rich firms (firms
with high earnings before depreciation in relation to investments) are sig-
52 The Fate of Firms: Explaining Mergers and Bankruptcies
Swedish private firms with 20 or more employees for that year was over 1 trillion kronor. These
private firms’ 604,000 employees exceeded the 525,000 employees working in publicly traded
firms.
nificantly more likely to be merger targets. But we find no significant support
for the prediction that high-growth and cash-poor firms are likely targets.
Second, we find that the likelihood of merger is negatively related to lever-
age and to whether the firm has used its inventories and receivables as 
collateral. These results indicate that firms with greater unused debt 
capacity are more likely to become merger targets. Third, public firms and
firms that are members of a corporate group are less likely to merge than
are other firms. Within corporate groups, resources can be channeled from
resource-rich firms with few growth opportunities to firms with better growth
opportunities, which reduces the need for financial synergy-based mergers.
Public firms, on the other hand, are under much greater scrutiny than
private firms, which likely improves access to external financing for prof-
itable projects.
We also find a more complex relation between firm performance and
merger status than prior studies suggest. Prior studies show a negative rela-
tion between performance and the likelihood of merger target status (e.g.,
Ambrose & Megginson 1992). We find that the relation changes sign and
becomes positive for highly performing firms.
Section II of this article briefly introduces Swedish insolvency and
merger laws and reviews theories of merger and bankruptcy. Section III
describes the data, discusses the Swedish economy during the period
studied, and provides descriptive statistics exploring the relation between
basic financial and accounting features—efficiency, liquidity, and leverage—
and firm status. Section IV reports multivariate results; Section V concludes.
II. The Law and Economics of Firm Transitions
This section first briefly describes Swedish insolvency and merger laws and
then reviews the merger and bankruptcy theories that we test empirically.
A. Swedish Insolvency and Merger Laws
1. Insolvency Proceedings
Financially distressed Swedish firms that rely on formal legal proceedings
use liquidating bankruptcy. A liquidating bankruptcy filing starts with either
the debtor or any creditor filing a petition with the court. Once in bank-
ruptcy, one or more trustees take control of the firm. The trustee’s basic
tasks are to sell the assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors according
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to the priority of their claims. Firms can be sold piecemeal but often are sold
as going concerns (Strömberg & Thornburn 1996).2
Swedish labor law provides an incentive to file for bankruptcy. The
Swedish Wage Guarantee Act (1992) makes the state liable “for the settle-
ment of an employee’s claim to payment from an employer who has been
declared bankrupt.” This government subsidy of bankruptcy probably con-
tributes to Sweden’s high business-bankruptcy filing rate. Sweden tends to
have a high filing rate compared to other countries in both recession years
and in more stable economic years (Eisenberg 1995).
2. Mergers
Mergers of Swedish corporations require shareholder approval. Swedish law
requires approval of a merger agreement by a simple majority at a share-
holders’ general meeting of the target company.3 The acquiring company’s
shareholders must also vote on the merger if more than 5 percent of the
target company’s shareholders request such a vote.4 Swedish Company Law
also includes rules to protect creditors. For example, an auditor must review
the financial statements of the combining companies and state whether
there is a risk that creditors will suffer losses after the merger. If the auditor
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2Swedish liquidating bankruptcy rules have much in common with U.S. Chapter 7, where bank-
rupt firms’ assets also are sold either piecemeal or as going concerns. See Strömberg and Thor-
burn (1996) for a more detailed review of the Swedish bankruptcy laws. However, going concern
sales of viable businesses are probably more common in Sweden than in the United States
because Swedish law contains no reorganization provisions comparable with U.S. Chapter 11.
Swedish law provides for compositions (a form of reorganization), but compositions are much
rarer in Sweden than are reorganizations in the United States (Eisenberg 1995). For example,
in 1994, compositions comprised only 0.46 percent of insolvency filings (Statistics Sweden
1995). The ratio of Chapter 11 filings in relation to total business insolvencies has been much
higher in the United States. In 1991, reorganization proceedings comprised about 45 percent
of all business filings. During the 1990s, reorganization filings regularly exceeded 24 percent
of all business insolvency filings (Eisenberg & Sundgren 1997). The nonuse of Sweden’s com-
position law may be because only unsecured debt can be written down in a composition. Unan-
imous consent from secured creditors and priority creditors is needed before their loan terms
can be altered. Furthermore, payments to unsecured creditors must exceed 25 percent of the
principal amount owed and must be paid within one year after approval of the composition.
3If the target is wholly owned by the acquiring company, the boards of the two companies may
enter into a merger agreement.
4Swedish Company Law, §§ 14:10–11.
finds such a risk, creditors may challenge the merger.5 Swedish law imposes
no substantial barriers to the merger of small and mid-size private firms. In
particular, Swedish labor law does not impose constraints on mergers. A 1974
proposal that employees participate in merger decisions was rejected and
Swedish labor law allows layoffs of workers of merged firms.6
B. Merger Theories
Several theories potentially explain firms’ transitions from active to merged
status. Merger theories include replacement of inefficient management,
financial synergies, operating synergies, and tax considerations.
1. Inefficient Management
Manne (1965) emphasizes the market for corporate control and views
mergers as a threat if a firm’s management lags in performance, either
because of inefficiency or because of agency problems. More generally, if
one firm’s management is more efficient than another firm’s, the inefficient
firm’s performance can be increased if the two firms merge. The need to
reorganize a corporate group through, for example, mergers of parents and
subsidiaries and subsequent restructuring (Slovin & Sushka 1998), is partic-
ularly strong if a firm is performing poorly. Following Healy et al. (1992),
Hotchkiss (1995), and other studies, we use an accounting-based industry
relative ratio to measure performance. The ratio, industry relative
return on assets, is the difference between the firm’s prior year’s return
on assets and the industry’s median return on assets in that year. Unless oth-
erwise stated, other accounting and financial variables are also lagged one
year relative to the year in which our models predict firm status. A second
measure of performance, more closely linked to financial stress and liquid-
ity, is interest coverage, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest
and depreciation to interest expenses.
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6The bulk of the firms studied here are private but it is worth noting that Scandinavian firms
have been reported to have weaker shareholder protection than common-law countries and
stronger protection than French civil-law countries (La Porta et al. 1998). Rossi and Volpin
(2004) found that merger and acquisition activity is significantly greater in countries with
stronger shareholder protection and better accounting standards.
2. Financial Synergies
In frictionless capital markets, funds will always be available to firms with
positive net present value investment opportunities. Market frictions such as
taxes, information asymmetries, and agency problems may, however, explain
why funds do not always flow to firms with profitable investment opportu-
nities. These problems decrease if firms belong to a corporate group and
have access to an internal capital market, since financial resources can then
be channeled from companies with poor growth opportunities to companies
with better growth opportunities. We use the dummy variable member of
corporate group, which equals 1 if the company belongs to an industrial
group, as the measure of membership in a corporate group.7
Financial synergy-based mergers may be more common if there is a
mismatch between the bidder’s and target’s growth opportunities and finan-
cial resources (Palepu 1986). This hypothesis implies that two types of firms
are likely targets: low-growth, resource-rich firms, and high-growth, resource-
poor firms. To measure growth opportunities, we use the variable change
in sales, calculated as the difference between a firm’s prior year’s sales and
its two-year earlier sales. We employ free cash flow, calculated as earnings
before depreciation of investments in plant and equipment, as a measure of
firm resources.8 We expect firms with low sales growth and high free cash
flow to be merger targets. Similarly, the growth-resource mismatch hypoth-
esis forecasts that firms with high sales growth and low free cash flow are
likely merger targets.
Two dummy variables represent these combinations of sales growth
and resources. low sales growth-high free cash flow equals 1 if sales
growth is in the bottom quartile of firms and free cash flow is in the top
quartile, and high sales growth-low free cash flow equals 1 if sales
growth is in the top quartile and free cash flow is in the bottom quartile. To
control for the level of the separate components of the dummy variables, we
also include in our models change in sales and free cash flow.
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7Research suggests possible uncertainty about whether diversifying mergers enhance value. For
example, Line and Servaes (1999) find no diversification discount in Germany but a 10 percent
discount in Japan and a 15 percent discount in Germany. Graham et al. (2002), who studied
firms that expanded through mergers, did not find that combining firms destroys value.
8Free cash flow can also be used to forecast agency-related mergers in public firms (Jensen
1986). Because small and mid-sized firms dominate our sample, we do not expect management-
shareholder agency issues to play a prominent role in forecasting mergers.
A diversifying merger can also increase the combined debt capacity of
two firms because it reduces the variability of earnings, and thus reduces
bankruptcy risk for any given level of debt. This, in turn, lowers the firms’
cost of capital by lowering the present value of future tax liabilities.9
We use three variables as measures of debt capacity. Following Ambrose
and Megginson (1992), we use the fixed assets ratio, measured as the
ratio of fixed assets to total assets, as a proxy. If a higher fixed assets ratio
positively correlates with the portion of assets not used as security for loans,
we expect the likelihood of merger to increase with higher values of the
ratio. Since, however, as discussed below, the fixed assets ratio also may
correlate with how firm specific a firm’s assets are, the relation between the
ratio and the likelihood of merger is ambiguous.
The variable fixed assets ratio does not account for the modern use
of inventory and receivables as collateral. We therefore use the variable
floating charge as a measure of debt capacity. It is a one-year lagged
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has granted a bank a floating charge
and 0 otherwise. The floating charge is a nonpossessory security device by
which firms can grant a security interest in their inventories, receivables, and
other changing assets. The absence of a floating charge implies that the firm
has greater debt capacity because it has uncollateralized assets. We therefore
expect a negative relation between the likelihood of merger and the pres-
ence of a floating charge.
Our third measure of debt capacity, industry relative leverage, is
the one-year lagged difference between the firm’s ratio of total debts to total
assets and the industry’s median value of total debts to total assets. We expect
a negative relation between the likelihood of merger and industry rela-
tive leverage.
Public firms may be less likely to merge than private firms because their
owners are likely to be more diversified than private owners. This reduces
the benefits from further diversification. Furthermore, public firms are
under closer scrutiny than private firms, implying that problems stemming
from information asymmetries are less severe and that public firms enjoy
better access to debt as well as equity financing. Thus, the financial syner-
gies of a merger may be less important for public firms. A dummy variable
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9A merger might result in increased leverage for other reasons. Before a merger, the acquirer
and the target might be underleveraged because managers are more risk averse than share-
holders or because of personal tax costs associated with increasing leverage. Merger can
increase the firms’ debt capacity.
labeled public firm indicates whether the company is publicly or closely
held.
3. Operating Synergies
A company wishing to obtain or add to its production capacity might be able
to increase capacity faster or more cheaply by buying a company that pro-
duces the product rather than by constructing a plant from scratch. Weston
et al. (1990) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) argue that targets are pri-
marily acquired to increase production rather than debt capacity. Thus,
another rationale for including the fixed assets ratio relates to operating
synergies.
4. Taxes
The Swedish Tax Code contains merger-related provisions that could moti-
vate acquisitions. Firms with accumulated tax losses and tax credits can
shelter the positive earnings of merger partners. Hence, at the corporate
level, tax benefits arise by allowing the acquiring firm to use past losses of
the acquired firm to offset the acquiring firm’s current and future profits.10
This suggests that firms with unused loss carryforwards are likely merger
targets. We use a firm’s accumulated losses, measured as the sum of prior
earnings, if that sum is negative, as the proxy for the magnitude of loss car-
ryforwards. Within-group losses are effectively deductible by the group.
Thus, companies within a corporate group can more efficiently use loss car-
ryforwards, implying that tax-driven mergers are expected to be less likely
among firms within a corporate group. This further strengthens the pre-
diction that there is a negative relation between member of corporate
group and merger likelihood.
5. Industrywide and Economywide Variables
Lambrecht (2004), Melicher et al. (1983), and other studies find that
takeovers are highly procyclical. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) find pro-
cyclical sales of assets. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest that the lower liq-
uidity of assets during times of industrywide or economywide recessions
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10After Sweden’s Tax Reform Act of 1987, the use of mergers to step up the tax basis of acquired
assets is not attractive.
helps explain the pattern: in recessions, many asset buyers are credit con-
strained and cannot pay the fundamental values of assets. Thus, sellers try
to postpone sales until markets become more liquid.
An industry can be financially constrained because firms are unable 
to meet recurring financial obligations or because firms rely heavily on 
debt. We use three measures of industrywide financial constraint: median
industry interest coverage (defined as annual median industry earnings
before depreciation and financial costs divided by financial costs), median
industry leverage (defined as annual median industry total debts to total
assets), and the industry bankruptcy rate (defined as the annual percent
of all firms in the industry that filed for bankruptcy). If mergers are less likely
when potential bidders are in financial distress, we expect mergers to be neg-
atively related to industry leverage and industry bankruptcy rate, and
positively related to the other industrywide measure. We are interested in
industrywide conditions in the year of transition, not in the prior year.
Accordingly, these industrywide measures are not lagged. Industry classifi-
cation is based on the major two-digit categories in the Swedish industrial
classification system, except that business services and real estate are three-
digit classifications. The 12 specific industry categories used account for over
85 percent of firms in the sample with approximately 15 percent of the firms
grouped in a residual 13th category labeled “other industries.”11
We account for the state of the economy by including a dummy vari-
able in the regressions. As described below, the Swedish economy started to
sour sometime in 1990 and started to recover sometime in 1993. We define
the dummy variable declining economy to equal 1 in 1990, 1991, and 1992
and 0 in 1993 and 1994, and expect that mergers are less likely during years
of decline. Precise matching of years and general economic conditions is
not essential as we are not trying to pinpoint the moment of downturn and
recovery. We only claim that the economy was headed in a worse direction
in the first three years of our study than in the last two years. With one excep-
tion, models using dummy variables for each year instead of the single vari-
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11The 12 specific industry categories are manufacturers of food, beverages, or tobacco; manu-
facturers of wood and wood products; manufacturers of paper and paper products; manufac-
turers of chemicals or plastics or petroleum; manufacturers of metal or machinery or
equipment; business services; wholesale; construction; transportation; restaurants or hotels;
retail; and real estate.
able distinguishing earlier and later time periods do not yield results mate-
rially different from those reported here.12
Shleifer and Vishny’s theory also suggests that markets are particularly
illiquid when assets are highly specialized. Since fixed assets generally are
more firm specific than current assets, the previously defined ratio of fixed
assets to total assets, fixed assets ratio, measures firm specificity of assets.
We expect a negative relation between this variable and the likelihood of
becoming a target. We note, however, that this ratio may be a poor proxy
for asset specificity. For example, office buildings are fixed assets that may
not be highly specialized and inventories, such as raw materials and work in
process, are nonfixed assets that often are specialized.
6. Other Firm Characteristics
Prior studies find that merger likelihood decreases with firm size (e.g.,
Ambrose & Megginson 1992; Cudd & Duggal 2000). To test this hypothesis
we include sales, defined as the one-year lag of the log of sales, in the regres-
sions, and expect smaller firms to be more likely to merge.
Finally, we include the company’s age, age of firm, in merger models.
Younger firms are more likely to be operated by their founders, and are thus
probably less likely to be merger targets. The same founder effect suggests
that, in older firms, the heirs are more likely to want to realize on their 
holdings.
C. Bankruptcy Theories
Bankruptcy theories focus on the likelihood of bankruptcy among active
firms as well as on the likelihood of bankruptcy as a resolution of financial
distress among firms that have encountered financial difficulties. Among
firms in financial distress, Gilson et al. (1990) suggest that the choice
between bankruptcy and private debt restructuring depends on two factors:
the cost savings of avoiding bankruptcy and the impediments to renegotia-
tions. Impediments to private settlement include holdout problems when
the firm’s debt is held by many diffuse creditors, informational asymmetry
problems that can arise between poorly informed outside creditors and
better informed managers, and conflicts of interest between different classes
of creditors.
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12In the merger portion of models using individual year dummy variables, the industry bank-
ruptcy rate variable is negative but not statistically significant.
1. Inefficiency
Several studies suggest that the probability of bankruptcy is a decreasing
function of the firm’s profitability (e.g., Altman 1968; Altman et al. 1977;
Ohlson 1980). Market competition forces inefficient firms to cease their
operations. We use the previously defined variables industry relative
return on assets, free cash flow, interest coverage, accumulated
loss, and change in sales as measures of firm performance.
2. Leverage
Many studies find that more leveraged firms are more likely to file for bank-
ruptcy (e.g., Altman 1968; Altman et al. 1977; Ohlson 1980). We use indus-
try relative leverage to measure leverage.
3. Industrywide and Economywide Variables
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest that liquidation values are lower during
periods of industrywide or economywide recession. Liquidity-constrained
potential buyers are unable to bid up to their valuation of firms’ assets. Since
the costs of selling assets at a low price can be avoided if the firm is reor-
ganized, their theory suggests that the likelihood of a liquidating bankruptcy
is lower among firms in distressed industries. Another effect, however, neu-
tralizes or even dominates the preceding effect. Industrywide measures of
bankruptcy correlate with the proportion of firms in an industry that are in
financial distress. Some financially distressed firms file for bankruptcy. Thus,
more firms in financially troubled industries may file for bankruptcy despite
special efforts to resist bankruptcy. As in the case of mergers, we use three
measures of industrywide financial constraints: industry interest cover-
age, industry leverage, and the industry bankruptcy rate. We
compute the industrywide measures for each of the five years studied and
for each of our 13 industry groups.
To test one aspect of Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) theory, it is helpful
to separate the effects of economywide conditions and industrywide condi-
tions on the likelihood of individual firm bankruptcy. declining economy,
our economywide variable, should correlate with increased probability of a
bankruptcy filing. We also include an interaction term between declining
economy and industry bankruptcy rate in the regressions. If firms are
more likely to resist bankruptcy in distressed industries during recessions,
we expect a negative sign on the interaction term during the years when the
Swedish economy was in decline.
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Finally, we include a fixed assets ratio in the regressions, since
markets are likely to be particularly thin for specialized assets during reces-
sions, as described above.
4. Informational Asymmetries
If lenders decide to renegotiate instead of pressing for a bankruptcy filing,
they may worry about the asset substitution problem. Diamond (1989) 
suggests that the incentive problems are most severe for borrowers with 
short track records but are less severe for firms having established a good
reputation. We use the age of firm as a measure, admittedly weak, of the
reputation effect. We thus expect age of firm to be negatively related to 
the likelihood of bankruptcy.13 However, our sample limits some of the 
possibilities for exploring the relation between age and firm status. All the
sample firms have at least 20 employees. Most firms presumably do not 
originate as firms with so many employees, they must grow to that size.14
Such growth takes time so we expect the sample firms to be considerably
older, on average, than the mass of firms that is not limited by number of
employees.
A dummy variable for public firm may serve as a proxy for how well
informed creditors are, as described above. As a consequence, information
problems may not hamper private debt renegotiations as much for public
firms and, therefore, bankruptcy may be a less likely resolution of financial
distress.
5. Conflicts Among Creditors
Conflicts among different groups of creditors may hamper private debt rene-
gotiations. Secured creditors that are well protected in bankruptcy have
strong incentives to trigger bankruptcy when they fear that continuing oper-
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13However, using age as a proxy for information asymmetry is ambiguous. One can imagine that
a young single-business firm is much more transparent than an older multiple-business
company.
14We find, for example, that only about 1 percent of the sample firms that merge or go bank-
rupt do so within one year of their creation. We would not expect such a low percentage of
very young firms in a sample that included firms smaller than those in our sample. Conditional
on filing for bankruptcy, those that failed sooner tended to be more leveraged, smaller, and
less likely to be in a corporate group than firms that took longer to fail. Conditional on being
a merger target, firms that merged at a younger age tended to be less leveraged, smaller, and
have fewer fixed assets than firms that took longer to merge.
ations threatens their collateral (Bergström et al. 2002). The existence of a
floating charge is used as a measure of how secured creditors are, and we
expect a positive relation between the likelihood of bankruptcy and the exis-
tence of a floating charge. A further justification for including floating
charge in bankruptcy models can be derived from Rajan and Winton
(1995). Their model suggests that banks, in order to balance the need to
monitor with concern about liquidating too many firms, should take collat-
eral only from relatively poorly performing firms.
6. Other Firm Characteristics
Prior studies suggest that the likelihood of bankruptcy correlates negatively
with firm size (e.g., Altman et al. 1977; Ohlson 1980). We use sales as the
measure of size. We also include member of corporate group in our bank-
ruptcy model. The potential cross-subsidies that allow poorly performing
firms to drain resources from better performing members of a group should
reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy.
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in our merger and bankruptcy
models and their expected signs.
III. Data and Univariate Results
This section describes the sample, provides historical perspective on the
1990–1994 sample period, and presents summary evidence on economy-
wide, industrywide, and firm-level results. It then reports univariate results.
A. Sample Selection and Economic Context
The sample covers the years 1990 to 1994 and includes all firms with 20 or
more employees in the database of UpplysningsCentralen AB (UC), the
largest Swedish credit bureau.15 The accounting data in UC’s files come 
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15We exclude from the analysis the few firms that exit the sample due to voluntary liquidation
or for unknown reasons. The workforce of some firms in the sample fell below our 20-employee
threshold during some of the years studied. We include observations for an active firm for years
in which the firm has fewer than 20 employees only if the firm has more than 20 employees in
some year from 1990 to 1994 and the firm has at least 15 employees in the year in question.
For years of bankruptcy or merger, we include firms if they have the requisite number of employ-
ees in the prior year because years of bankruptcy or merger are associated with missing or less
accurate employee and other data. For firms with 20 or more employees in at least one year,
missing values for the number of employees in other years are interpolated based on the firm’s
sales to determine eligibility of the observation for inclusion in the sample.
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Table 1: Independent Variables and Their Relation to Merger and Bank-
ruptcy Hypotheses
Merger Bankruptcy
Variable Definition Hypothesis Hypothesis Predicted Sign
Firm-Level Merger Bankruptcy
Variables
accumulated Sum of prior Tax reasons Performance - -
losses (log) years’ earnings
(if negative)
age of firm Age of firm in Founder Incentive + -
1,000s of days effects problems
change in Current year’s Financial Performance ? -
sales sales minus synergies
previous year’s
sales (log)
fixed assets Ratio of fixed Financial Specialized ? -
ratio assets to total and assets
assets operating
synergies/
specialized
assets
floating Dummy Financial Conflicts of - +
charge variable = 1 if the synergies interest
firm has issued a between
floating charge different
classes of
creditors
free cash flow Ratio of earnings Financial Performance ? -
before interest to synergies
investments in
plant and
equipment
high sales Dummy variable Financial n.a. + ?
growth-low = 1 if sales growth synergies
free cash flow is in top quartile
and free cash flow
is in bottom
quartile
industry Ratio of firm’s Financial Leverage - +
relative total debt to assets synergies
leverage less industry
median ratio
industry Firm’s return on Performance Performance - -
relative assets less industry
return on median return on
assets assets
Bergström et al. 65
Table 1: Continued
Merger Bankruptcy
Variable Definition Hypothesis Hypothesis Predicted Sign
interest Ratio of earnings Performance, Performance, ? -
coverage before interest leverage leverage
and depreciation
to interest
expenses
low sales Dummy variable Financial n.a. + ?
growth-high = 1 if sales growth synergies
free cash flow is in bottom
quartile and free
cash flow is in top
quartile
member of Dummy variable Financial Cross-subsidies - -
corporate = 1 if member of synergies/ between firms
group corporate group taxes in a corporate
group
public firm Dummy variable Financial Informational - -
= 1 if public firm synergies asymmetries
sales (log) Net sales Prior Prior empirical - -
empirical evidence
evidence
Industrywide,
Economywide
Variables
industry Industry’s median Industry Industry - ?
leverage ratio of total debt constraints constraints,
to assets viability of
firms in the
industry
industry Industry’s median Industry Industry + ?
interest ratio of earnings constraints constraints,
coverage before interest viability of
and depreciation firms in the
to interest industry
expenses
industry Ratio of number Industry Industry - ?
bankruptcy of bankruptcies to constraints constraints,
rate total number of viability of
firms in the firms in the
industry industry
declining Dummy variable Economy Economy - +
economy = 1 for years 1990, constraints constraints
1991, 1992
from annual financial statements that every Swedish corporation must file.
UC supplements these data with information from a public file (Företagin-
teckningsregistret) as to whether a firm has granted a creditor a floating
charge. This is also an official government source. Data about firm transi-
tions—mergers and bankruptcies—come from the Patent and Registration
Office and Statistics Sweden. The government also maintains these data
sources.
Our empirical results must be interpreted against a background of
changes in the Swedish economy. Sweden deregulated its financial markets
in the late 1980s. This occurred during an economic expansion that,
together with a tax system that favored borrowing, led to a huge credit
expansion and a real estate boom. In the early 1990s, Sweden enacted major
tax reform legislation that favored savings. This occurred in the midst of a
weakening economy and a strong commitment by the central bank to curb
inflation. The inflation rate fell rapidly, resulting in a sharp increase in real
interest rates and a crash in the real estate industry.
Thus, during the early years covered by this study, the Swedish
economy turned sour and suffered a deep recession. Table 2 provides his-
torical data for the period 1986–1998. The gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rate began to decrease in 1990 and recovered by 1994. Annual GDP
growth was 1.4 percent during 1990, -1.1 percent during 1991, -1.4 percent
during 1992, -2.2 percent during 1993, and 3.3 percent during 1994. Unem-
ployment followed the same pattern as GDP.
Figure 1 compares GDP growth with year-earlier quarters. It shows that
the economy’s turn for the worse probably began in early 1990. By the end
of 1990, GDP growth over year-earlier quarters had all but ceased, and the
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Table 2: Swedish Gross Domestic Product Growth, 1986–1998
Year % GDP Growth Year % GDP Growth
1986 2.1 1993 -2.2
1987 3.1 1994 3.3
1988 2.3 1995 3.9
1989 2.4 1996 1.3
1990 1.4 1997 1.8
1991 -1.1 1998 3.3
1992 -1.4
Source: Statistics Sweden.
economy was in a downward spiral. In 1993, the pattern of increasing GDP
declines ceased and the economy showed positive GDP growth over year-
earlier quarters beginning in late 1993.
B. Sample Characteristics
Panel A of Table 3 shows firm status by year for our sample. Active firms
comprise 52,601 observations of 14,880 firms covering 1990 to 1994.16 There
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16New firms may enter the sample after 1990 so not all firms need have existed in 1990. By 
introducing a dummy variable equal to 1 for companies incorporated during the sample period
and equal to 0 for firms incorporated before 1990, we tested whether the firms entering our
sample from 1990–1994 bias the results. This dummy variable was not significant. We also com-
pared firm status by year for firms that were incorporated in the sampling period with firms
that were registered before 1990. No significant differences in merger and bankruptcy rates
were found.
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Figure 1: Percent Swedish GDP growth over year-earlier quarter.
are also 1,785 bankrupt firms and 1,106 merged firms in the sample.17 Strik-
ingly high bankruptcy rates, over 5 percent in 1990 and 1991, decrease to
less than 1 percent by 1994. Merger rates show the opposite trend, with
almost none in years with high bankruptcy rates, and a rate approaching 5
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17Firms that ultimately merge or go bankrupt are categorized as active in the years prior to 
their merger or bankruptcy. Missing data disproportionately occur in bankrupt firms and occur 
Table 3: Firm Status by Year and Interest Coverage Status, 1990–1994
Firm Status
Year Active Bankrupt Merged Total
A. All Firms
1990 11,264 631 78 11,973
(94.08) (5.27) (0.65) (100)
1991 10,794 665 119 11,578
(93.23) (5.74) (1.03) (100)
1992 10,670 295 196 11,161
(95.60) (2.64) (1.76) (100)
1993 10,437 131 245 10,813
(96.52) (1.21) (2.27) (100)
1994 9,436 63 468 9,967
(94.67) (0.63) (4.70) (100)
Total 52,601 1,785 1,106 55,492
(94.79) (3.21) (1.99) (100)
B. Firms with Interest Coverage < 1
1990 411 50 2 463
(88.77) (10.80) (0.43) (100)
1991 561 86 9 656
(85.52) (13.11) (1.37) (100)
1992 632 46 23 701
(90.16) (6.56) (3.28) (100)
1993 791 23 24 838
(94.39) (2.74) (2.86) (100)
1994 477 14 38 529
(90.17) (2.65) (7.18) (100)
Total 2,872 219 96 3,187
(90.12) (6.87) (3.01) (100)
Note: Firm status as active, bankrupt, or merged for 55,492 observations of 15,828 Swedish
corporations with 20 or more employees, 1990 to 1994. Panel A includes all firms. Panel B is
limited to firms with an interest coverage ratio less than 1. The percent of firms in each status
in each year is shown in parentheses. Chi-squared probabilities for Panels A and B are less than
10-17. Chi-squared probabilities for active firm rates compared with bankrupt firms rates, and
for active firm rates compared with merged firm rates, are all less than 0.001.
percent in 1994. Consistent with the procyclical movement of merger activ-
ity found in the United States, the relation between merger activity and busi-
ness failure is negative in Table 3.
Panel B of Table 3 shows firm status by year for those firms with inter-
est coverage of less than 1. Definitions of financial distress frequently use
interest coverage ratios (e.g., Asquith et al. 1994; Hoshi et al. 1990). The
panel shows that, in this comprehensive sample, the vast bulk of merger
targets and bankrupt firms do not satisfy conventional definitions of low
interest coverage. Limiting the sample to firms with interest coverage of less
than 1 would reduce the sample to less than 13 percent of the bankrupt
firms and less than 9 percent of the merged firms.18
For each year, our three industrywide measures, industry interest
coverage, industry leverage, and industry bankruptcy rate, show 
substantial and statistically significant (beyond p = 0.001 in each year)
interindustry effects. We also find substantial and significant within-industry
time effects. Bankruptcy rates differ significantly over time for each of the
industry groups other than food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing.
Median interest coverage varies significantly over time for every industry
except real estate. Leverage varies significantly over time for nine of the thir-
teen industry groups. For example, 1990 bankruptcy rates ranged from 2.9
percent for food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturers to 19.2 percent for
real estate firms. Although the real estate bankruptcy rate declined to 4.5
percent by 1994, it was still the highest rate of any industry for that year.
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in approximate proportion to their frequency for merged firms. Our sample therefore 
overrepresents active firms. In the regression models presented below, we account for this over-
sampling by weighting active, merged, and bankrupt firms by the inverse of the probability of
their being included in the sample. Weights are based on the number of firms in each status
with missing and nonmissing data. We deem a firm to have nonmissing data if its accounting
report contains a figure for the basic accounting measure, firm sales. Nonmissing data are
present for 89.4 percent of active firms, 91.0 percent of merged firms, and 66.0 percent of bank-
rupt firms.
18We note an ambiguity regarding the precise year of firm bankruptcy filings. Firms often do
not file the required accounting data for the year preceding a bankruptcy filing. For firms
known to have filed for bankruptcy, we designate the year of bankruptcy to be the year follow-
ing the last full year of reporting. Some firms therefore will be deemed to have filed for bank-
ruptcy one year earlier than they actually filed for bankruptcy. To be conservative about time
effects, we limit the economywide variable declining economy to two values, 1 for the early
years of the study and 0 for the later years. Figure 1 suggests that the economy was headed in
a worse direction during the study’s earlier years than during its later years.
Median industrywide interest coverage ratios vary in 1990 from 1.725 for real
estate firms to 3.931 for manufacturers of metal, machinery, or equipment.
In 1994, interest coverage ratios vary from 1.478 for real estate firms to 9.382
for the same manufacturing group.
1. Firm-Level Characteristics and Univariate Results
Table 4 shifts the focus to the individual firm level from the economywide
and industrywide levels. Table 4 provides summary statistics about the vari-
ables that Section II’s theoretical discussion suggests influence bankruptcy
and merger.
Table 4 shows an overall negative correlation between one-year lagged
industry relative return on assets and merger-target status. This 
correlation is, however, the net result of a positive correlation between 
performance and merger for highly performing firms, and a negative 
correlation for poorly performing firms. Of firms in the bottom quartile of
industry relative return on assets, merger targets tend to underper-
form active firms. Merged firms in this quartile have mean and median
industry relative return on assets of -0.331 and -0.152, respectively.
The comparable figures for active firms in this quartile are -0.221 and 
-0.116, respectively. For firms in the top three quartiles of industry rela-
tive return on assets, merger targets tend to outperform active firms.
Merger targets in these quartiles have mean and median industry rela-
tive return on assets of 0.104 and 0.045, respectively. The comparable
figures for active firms in these quartiles are 0.054 and 0.023, respectively.
Table 4’s penultimate column shows that these active firm-merged firm dif-
ferences are highly statistically significant for both quartile groups.
Figure 2 confirms this relation between merger-target status and indus-
try relative return on assets. Using kernel density estimates (Wand &
Jones 1995), it displays the distributions of merged firms’ and active firms’
industry relative return on assets. It shows that the merged firms’ dis-
tribution is noticeably flatter, with greater concentrations of both highly per-
forming firms and of poorly performing firms.
IV. Multivariate Results
The data are amenable to analysis using multinomial logit models for a
complex survey design. In the design, the data have been stratified by indus-
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try and cluster sampled by firm.19 We let (h, i, j) index the firms in the
sample, where h = 1, . . . L are 13 industry strata,20 i = 1, . . . , Nh are the dif-
ferent firms in each industry h, and j = 1, . . . Mhi are the individual yearly
observations of each firm i. The regression coefficients b = (b1, b2)T are the
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19Shumway (2001) presents evidence for using hazard models in bankruptcy prediction. He
points out that one of the problems with traditional bankruptcy models, discriminant analysis
and classical cross-sectional logit-type models, is their inability to incorporate time varying
covariates. A hazard rate model may be more appropriate if the length of the panel observa-
tions is long enough to assure that the observations are recorded in continuous time. This is
not the case with the data we have, which comprise yearly data covering 1990–1994. Therefore,
we use a panel data logit model. These estimates have a clearer interpretation than the change
in the log hazard ratio for a unit increase in an independent variable than one obtains from a
hazard rate regression model. An additional possible problem for hazard rate regression models
in this context is that the censoring rate is very heavy and is possibly dependent on the survival
time, which may lead to invalid inferences (see Kalbfleish & Prentice 1980).
20See note 11, supra, for information about the industry strata.
Industry Relative ROA
 Active Firms  Merged Firms
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1
Figure 2: Kernel density estimates, distributions of industry relative return
on assets by firm status.
Note: Kernel density estimates of the distributions of industry relative return on assets for
14,871 active firms and 1,092 merged firms. For active firms observed in more than one year,
a firm-level average is computed before the density estimates.
parameters that we wish to estimate, where b1 represents the vector of param-
eters in the multinomial logit regression comparing bankrupt firms to active
firms and b2 represents the vector of parameters comparing merged firms
to active firms. Active firms are the dependent variable’s reference category
with respect to which the b are estimated. b is defined with respect to an
outcome variable Yhij and a row vector of explanatory variables Xhij. Assume
that (Yhij, Xhij) are related via a multinomial logit regression model. Let l(b;
Yhij, Xhij) be the associated log likelihood under this model. We define the
parameter b by the vector estimating equation
(1)
where S = ∂l/∂b is the first derivative of of l(b; Yhij, Xhij) with respect to b.
The coefficients are computed via standard likelihood techniques and the t
statistics are computed using Taylor series-based weighted likelihood stan-
dard errors (see Wolter 1985), adjusted for the complex design.
Table 5 reports four multinomial logit models. They vary two factors.
First, they differ in the industrywide measures used to proxy for industry con-
ditions. All models include industry bankruptcy rate as an explanatory
variable. Models 3 and 4 also include industry interest coverage and
industry leverage as explanatory variables. Second, the models differ in
the firm-level explanatory variables used. Models 1 and 3 do not include free
cash flow, change in sales, or the two growth-resource mismatch dummy
variables computed from these two variables. This is because each of these
firm-level variables requires two prior years of data.
The real estate industry’s crash and extreme performance—for
example, bankruptcy rates for real estate firms in the sample reached 24.1
percent in 1991—warrants using a real estate dummy variable in the models.
We have run models similar to those in Table 5 on each industry individu-
ally and Table 5’s results are not a consequence of conditions in one or a
few industries.
A. Firm-Level Results
1. Firm Performance
Table 5 shows several firm-level results. Consider first the relation between
industry relative return on assets and the likelihood of a merger. To
account for Table 4’s interquartile effects between merger and industry
G S Y Xhij hij
j
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relative return on assets, we include in the merger equations a bottom
quartile dummy variable. It equals 1 if a firm’s industry relative return
on assets is in the lowest quartile of industry relative return on assets and
0 otherwise. The dummy variable adjusts the intercept of the merger esti-
mates to reflect Table 4’s interquartile effects. To adjust the slope, we include
in the merger models an interaction term between the bottom quartile
dummy and industry relative return on assets. Thus the variable
industry relative return on assets reflects the relation between merger
and performance for the highest three quartiles of firms. The interaction
term reflects the difference between the bottom quartile and the top three
quartiles of firms.
The coefficient of industry relative return on assets is positive
and significant in all regressions, indicating that highly performing firms are
more likely to merge than are other firms. The interaction term is nega-
tive and significant at or beyond the 0.01 level in all regressions. Thus, 
significant interquartile differences exist in the relation between firm 
performance and the likelihood of merger. To explore the relation between
merger and performance in the bottom quartile of firms, we test the hypoth-
esis that the coefficients for the interaction term and the industry rel-
ative return on assets sum to 0. One can reject this hypothesis in all
equations at or beyond the 0.01 level. Thus, among poorly performing firms,
those with the poorest performance tend to merge rather than continue as
active firms.
The performance effects are far from trivial. Using average values of
the variables, for firms in the top three quartiles of performance, a 10
percent increase in industry relative return on assets corresponds to
approximately a 3.8 percent increase in the probability of merger. (This and
other size estimates are based on Model 1 in Table 5.) For firms in the
bottom performing quartile, a 10 percent increase in industry relative
return on assets corresponds to approximately a 2.7 percent decrease in
the probability of merger.
That the likelihood of merger correlates positively with performance
for the upper three quartiles of performance contradicts the predictions by
Manne (1965), and also suggests the need to reevaluate some prior empir-
ical evidence. Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) used the
average excess stock market return as a measure of performance and found
that it strongly and negatively relates to the likelihood of becoming a target.
These studies did not explore whether results differ for different quartiles
of performance. Our results suggest that a more complex relation between
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performance and merger-target status might be masked by not accounting
for the tendency of highly performing firms to be targets.
As expected, industry relative return on assets also correlates with
bankruptcy. The correlation is negative and significant in all models. This is
consistent with the evidence in several prior studies (e.g., Ohlson 1980).
2. Growth-Resource Mismatches
Table 5 confirms the positive relation between low sales growth-high
free cash flow and subsequent merger status. The second growth-resource
mismatch dummy variable, high sales growth-low free cash flow, has
a positive but insignificant sign. This contrasts with Table 4’s finding that this
dummy variable had a lower value for merged firms than for active firms.
Thus the positive signs on both growth-resource mismatch dummy variables
are more consistent with theories of internal capital markets than are the
results reported in Table 4. The first dummy variable’s significance supports
the popular notion that a mismatch between growth opportunities and avail-
able resources drives mergers.
Furthermore, in both merger models containing change in sales,
Models 2 and 4, the coefficient for the variable is negative and significantly
different from 0 at the 0.01 level. The fact that merger correlates negatively
with sales growth suggests that targets are not acquired for the sales growth
opportunities. This negative correlation is consistent with Palepu’s finding,
and further supports the view that targets typically are low-growth firms.
3. Debt Capacity
In all models, industry relative leverage is negatively correlated with
merger and the effect is highly significant and large. A 10 percent increase
in industry relative leverage reduces merger probability by approxi-
mately 8.5 percent. Similarly, the floating charge dummy variable is neg-
atively and significantly correlated with merger status, implying that firms
with no floating charge are more likely to merge. The presence of a float-
ing charge reduces merger likelihood by approximately 1.32 percent. The
presence of a floating charge leaves less room for the acquiring firm to grant
security to finance acquisitions or future projects of the combined firm.
These results are consistent with the notion that mergers are used to expand
debt capacity and with Palepu (1986) and Asquith et al. (1994).
Table 5 shows that the likelihood of becoming a target correlates neg-
atively with being a member of corporate group. Membership in a cor-
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porate group may reduce the likelihood of a financial synergy-based merger
because a cash-constrained member of a group with high growth opportu-
nities can obtain contributions from other firms in its group that generate
more cash but have poorer growth opportunities. Tax-driven mergers are
also expected to be less common for members of a corporate group, as dis-
cussed above.
Debt-related factors play a substantial role in routing firms to bank-
ruptcy. In all models, industry relative leverage is positively correlated
with bankrupt status. A 10 percent increase in industry relative lever-
age corresponds to a 7.0 percent increase in the probability of bankruptcy.
Similarly, the floating charge dummy variable is positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with bankrupt status. The positive relation between secured
debt (measured with the floating charge dummy) and bankruptcy is consis-
tent with Asquith et al.’s (1994) findings. The positive relation between lever-
age and bankruptcy is also consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Altman 1968;
Altman et al. 1977; Ohlson 1980).
4. Fixed Assets Ratio
Section II’s discussion suggested an ambiguous relation between the fixed
assets ratio and merger-target status. Consistent with that discussion, 
no significant relation between the ratio and merger status is found in 
Table 5. Theory is less ambiguous about the relation between bankruptcy
and the fixed assets ratio. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest that markets
for firm-specific assets are particularly illiquid. If the fixed assets ratio
correlates positively with how firm specific assets are, one expects a 
negative relation between bankruptcy and the ratio. Table 5 shows a such a
relation.
5. Other Firm Characteristics
As noted above, Swedish tax law creates a potential tax benefit by allowing
acquiring firms to offset current and future profits with accumulated losses
of acquired firms. Thus, tax-driven acquisitions should be more likely to
occur if the target has higher deductible losses. We use accumulated loss
as a proxy for tax losses and, as expected, the coefficients are negative:
smaller accumulated losses decrease the likelihood of a merger. The coeffi-
cients are significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level in the full-sample
regressions and are in the same direction in the models using one less year’s
data.
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Table 5 also shows that firm size, measured by sales (log), correlates
negatively with bankruptcy. A possible explanation is that creditors are better
informed about the qualities of larger firms and their managers. With larger
sums at stake, creditors have a greater incentive to monitor firms prior to
default. Other results indicating that informational asymmetry problems
may drive distressed firms into liquidation bankruptcy are that public firms
and older firms are significantly less likely to file for bankruptcy than are
private firms and younger firms.
Considering mergers, the results indicate a weak positive relation
between the likelihood of merger and firm size. This contrasts with most
prior studies, which report a negative relation between size and merger 
likelihood.21
The likelihood of becoming a target also correlates negatively with
being a public firm. Owners of public firms, on average, may be better diver-
sified than owners of private firms, implying that diversification-driven
mergers are less common among public firms. Public companies also have
better access to capital markets, suggesting that mergers based on financial
synergy are not so important to them.
B. Industrywide and Economywide Results
All models in Table 5 include industry bankruptcy rate as an industry-
wide measure to proxy for industry conditions.22 In addition, the models
include the declining economy dummy variable to account for the 
economywide effect as well as an interaction term between industry 
bankruptcy rate and declining economy. Given the presence of the
interaction terms, the coefficient for industry bankruptcy rate captures
the relation between industrywide bankruptcy rates and firm status for the
years designated recovery years. Models 3 and 4 also include the industry-
wide measures industry interest coverage and industry leverage.
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21Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find a negative correlation between size
and the likelihood of merger, and Powell (1997) finds a positive correlation between size and
hostile takeovers and a negative correlation between size and friendly takeovers.
22In a smaller sample, using the industrywide bankruptcy rate to help explain individual firms’
bankruptcy probability would present a potentially serious endogeneity problem. In our sample,
each industry has at least several hundred observations so this problem is minimized. In addi-
tion, the coefficients on the firm-level variables do not materially change in models that exclude
the industrywide bankruptcy rate.
In every model, for the recovery years, a positive correlation exists
between industry bankruptcy rate and the likelihood of individual 
firm bankruptcy. A negative correlation exists between the bankruptcy rate
and the likelihood of merger for such years. The table also shows that indus-
try interest coverage correlates positively with merged status in Models
3 and 4. Not surprisingly, the coefficient for declining economy shows 
that bankruptcy is more likely in a period of decline than in a period of
recovery.
In the merger results, the declining economy coefficient suggests 
that worse economywide conditions correlate with decreasing likelihood of
merger. The finding that merger activity is procyclical is consistent with
Melicher et al. (1983) and supports Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) theory.
Mergers’ decreasing likelihood during industry recessions is surprising
unless one accounts for asset liquidity. If potential buyers lack enough inter-
nal funds and are credit constrained, they may be unable to bid up to their
valuation of the assets. As a consequence, sellers will try to postpone selling
until potential acquirers are more liquid.
Table 5’s industry bankruptcy rate-declining economy interac-
tion term explores whether the relation between individual firm bankruptcy
and industrywide bankruptcy rates changes between declining and recover-
ing economic conditions. In Model 1, for example, the coefficient for the
interaction term is negative and significant. Compared to recovery years, and
holding other factors constant, firms were less likely to file for bankruptcy
the higher the industrywide bankruptcy rate applicable to the firm. Hence,
the interaction term suggests that in bad economic times, firms in industries
with high bankruptcy rates are less likely to file for bankruptcy than they are
in recovery periods. In recovery periods, firms in industries with high bank-
ruptcy rates are more likely to file for bankruptcy than they are in declining
economic times. In other words, firms in distressed industries resist bank-
ruptcy in bad times and flock to it in good times.
The effect is not small. During the period of economic recovery, a 1
percent increase in the industrywide bankruptcy rate corresponds to a 1.19
percent increase in individual firms’ probability of filing for bankruptcy.
During the period of economic decline, a 1 percent increase in a firm’s
industrywide bankruptcy rate corresponds to only a 0.33 percent increase in
a firm’s probability of filing for bankruptcy. These findings support Shleifer
and Vishny’s (1992) prediction that, during periods of economic decline,
the likelihood of a liquidating bankruptcy is relatively lower for industries
in financial distress.
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The interaction term also yields results bearing on mergers. If firms in
an industry are potential buyers but lack financial resources during reces-
sions, one might expect mergers to be less likely in industries with relatively
high bankruptcy rates during a recession. Surprisingly, the coefficient for
the industry bankruptcy rate-declining economy interaction term is
positive and significant. Compared to recovery years, and holding other
factors constant, firms were more likely to merge the higher the industry-
wide bankruptcy rate applicable to the firm. The interaction term suggests
that in bad economic times, firms in industries with high bankruptcy rates
are more likely to merge than they are in recovery periods. In recovery
periods, firms in industries with high bankruptcy rates are less likely to
merge than they are in declining economic times. Firms in distressed indus-
tries flock to merger in bad times and resist it in good times. One possible
explanation for this result is that financially distressed firms are more likely
to merge than to file for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy costs may be particularly
high if the industry or the economy is financially distressed, which increases
the incentive to negotiate a merger rather than to incur the high bankruptcy
costs (Haugen & Senbet 1978; Shleifer & Vishny 1992).
As a check on the robustness of our results, we have run the same
models without firms from the most depressed industry, real estate, and the
results do not differ materially from those reported here.
C. Routing Between Merger and Bankruptcy
To explore the routing of firms between merger and bankruptcy, we test the
hypotheses that each explanatory variable in Model 1 differs significantly
between merger and bankruptcy outcomes. The differences between all vari-
ables except accumulated losses are statistically significant. Table 5’s models
thus provide evidence about the routing of firms between merger and bank-
ruptcy. At the firm level, debt-related variables play an especially prominent
role in distinguishing between which firms merge and which go bankrupt.
Firms with high leverage and floating charges tend to go bankrupt. Those
with low leverage and no floating charge tend to merge.
V. Conclusion
This article presents evidence about the forces influencing mergers and
bankruptcy for a comprehensive sample of predominantly small and mid-
sized Swedish firms covering the period 1990 to 1994. This period includes
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years of a recession as well as years of recovery. The sample includes almost
all Swedish firms with 20 or more employees.
Several results show how firm-specific and industrywide factors influ-
ence the likelihood of merger and bankruptcy. Merger activity is much
greater in prosperous periods than during recessions. This result corre-
sponds with prior evidence reported by Becketti (1986) and others. A pos-
sible reason for this is that market liquidity influences merger activity.
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) illiquidity arguments are verified in that bank-
ruptcy is less likely in industries with high bankruptcy rates during bad eco-
nomic times than during normal economic times. Firms in distressed
industries resist liquidating bankruptcy in bad times and flock to it during
good times.
At the firm level, we find that financial synergy-based factors help
explain mergers for the class of firms studied here. In a test of the hypoth-
esis that a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities explains mergers,
we find that resource-rich firms and firms with low-growth opportunities are
likely to become merger targets. Furthermore, debt capacity, leverage, and
whether a firm belongs to a corporate group are significant predictors of
mergers.
The relation between firm performance and merger status is more
complex than prior studies suggest. Among poorly performing firms, merger
likelihood increases with lower performance. Among better performing
firms, merger likelihood increases with better performance. Prior studies
primarily show a negative relation between merger and performance.
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